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In Neveu's variant of the stopping problem, a randomized strategy is considered in order to 
relax a condition on values of two stochastic sequences. We shall describe the variant of the 
problem as a zero sum two person sequential game and show that a solution for a recursive 
equation of the game value exists. Neveu's condition reduces the equilibrium solution to a Markov 
time among the class of randomized strategies. 
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1. Neveu's stopping problem 
In the Chapter 6 of Neveu's (1975) book, a modification of the game conceived 
by Dynkin (1969) is presented as an optimization problem in martingale theory. 
The game variant of the stopping problem by Dynkin is as follows: Two players 
observe a stochastic sequence X(n) ,  n = 1, 2 . . . . .  I f  each of them chooses a strategy, 
A,/.t respectively both Markov times, the payoff is given by 
= ~'X(A) on {A <~/z}, (1.1) 
R(A,/x) (X ( / z )  on {3.>/z}. 
The first player is to maximize the expected value of (1.1) and the other is to 
minimize. Dynkin proved the existence of the game value and optimal strategy with 
a restriction on the moves of the game. Under  the same formulation, Kiefer (1971) 
obtained another existence condition. Neveu modified the payoff in the Dynkin's 
problem as follows: There are two preassigned stochastic sequences X(n) ,  Y(n) ,  
and for each strategy of the two players A and /z (which are Markov times and 
without Dynkin 's  constraint on moves), the payoff equals 
IX (A)  on {A ~</z}, (1.2/ 
R(A' ~)  = [ Y(/z) on {A >/z}, 
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with the condition 
X(n)<~ Y(n) for each n. (1.3) 
Under a regularity condition for the integrability of supremum or infimum of the 
sequences he proved the existence of the game (min-max) value and e-optimal 
(equilibrium) strategy. Assuming the essential condition (1.3), several authors such 
as Krylov (1970) and Bismut (1977) considered the stopping game problem of 
random processes. 
In this paper we assign three stochastic sequences to the payoff of two players: 
one sequence is used when Player 1 stops sooner than the other; the second is when 
Player 2 is faster and the third is when both stop simultaneously. Let X(n),  Y(n) 
and W(n) denote these sequences respectively. This problem is formulated as the 
multi-stage two person zero sum game (2 x2 Matrix game) with the intention of 
extending a strategy from a Markov time (a pure strategy) to a randomized one. 
Although the extension is meaningless in a one person problem (Chow, Robbins, 
Siegmund (1971, in Chap 5.3)), a randomization should be considered in the 
situation. Neveu discusses the infinite horizon case but we firstly consider the finite 
horizon case, referring to Chow, Robbins, Siegmund. Then we give a condition for 
the existence of a game value in the infinite horizon case with a discount factor. 
This problem resembles Everett's Recursive game in Luce, Raiffa (1972) and the 
arbitration problem in Chatterjee (1981). A similar stochastic game, in which 
stopping can occur by mutual agreement, is discussed by Sakaguchi (1980). 
2. Randomized strategy 
Let (/2, 0%, p) be a probability space with an increasing sub o~-field ;~(n) (alter- 
nately ~, )  of ~-. Suppose we are given the trio: X(n), '  Y(n) and W(n), which are 
sequences of integrable random variables adapted to o~(n) for each n. We consider 
the following game: There are two players and each of them chooses as his strategy 
a stopping time. If A and/z are the stopping times of the first and the second player 
respectively, then the corresponding payoff is of the form 
R(A,/.t) = X(A)I(A<,,I+ W(h)I~x~,~+ Y(/x)I~a>,~ (2.1) 
where I is an indicator function. That is, the process is stopped when either of the 
two players declares top and the payoffs are given according to their declaration. 
However, without conditions such as (1.3), an equilibrium pair of Markov times 
does not exist. So we propose that the class of strategies should be extended from 
a pure one (a Markov time) to a randomized one. The adapted scheme in this paper 
is as follows: 
Definition 2.1. A strategy for each player is a random sequence p = (p , )~ ~ or 
q = (%) c g~ such that, for each n, 
(i) p, and qn are adapted to ..~(n), 
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(ii) 0 ~< p,, q, <~ 1 with probability 1. 
I f  each random variable equals either 0 or 1, we call it a pure strategy. 
Let A~, A2 . . . .  and B~, B2,... be independent identically distributed random 
variables of uniform distribution on [0, 1 ] and independent of V ~ ~ o~(n). Let ~(n) 
be the o--field generated by if(n), {Aa, A2,. •.,  A,} and {B1, B2, . . . ,  B,}. The proba- 
bility space is, without loss of generality, rich enough to support the additional 
randomisation. A randomized stopping time ,~(p) for a strategy p = (p , )~ ~ and 
/z(q) for a strategy q = (q,) c 9 are defined, respectively, by 
.~(p)=inf{n>~l:A,<~p,}, tz(q)=inf{n>~l:Bn<-q,}. (2.2) 
Definition 2.2. For a strategy p = (Pn) c ~ and q = (q,) ~ ~ of each player, define a 
payoff: 
(X (a (p) )  if {)t (p) </z(q)}, 
R(p, q) = ~ W()t(p)) = W(l~(q)) if {;t(p) = tz(q)}, (2.3) 
/ 
~Y(t-t(q)) if {A(p) >/z(q)} 
provided 3. (p) and/x (q) are randomized ({ ~3(n) }- measurable) stopping times. 
Clearly if each Pn is either zero or one, then A(p) is in fact an {~(n)}-stopping 
time, and the strategy is pure and corresponds to a Markov time. In particular an 
{~-(n)}-stopping time a corresponds to the strategy p = (p,) with p, = I{~=,} where 
I is an indicator function. 
The aim of Player 1 (respectively Player 2) is to make the expectation of the 
payoff as large (as small) as possible. Firstly we consider a finite horizon case, which 
is restricted to N stages. Let 
~={p= (p , )c  ~;p ,  . . . . .  p,_, =0, pu = 1} (2.4) 
denotes all of the strategies between stage n and N for Player 1. Similarly 5~ N 
denotes all of the strategies between n and N for Player 2. 
Let 
~ff = essinf esssup E~"[R(p, q)], yN = esssup essinfE~"[R(p, q)]. 
(2.5) 
A pair of strategies which coincides with the minimax (infsup in (2.5)) and 
maximin (supinf in (2.5)) strategy is called an equilibrium strategy. Note that, by 
(2.2), 
~N y.  = essinfesssup E~"[R(3.,/~)] and 7~ = esssup essinf Ea~"[R(a,/~)] 
where A~, M,  N are a class of Markov times such that n ~< a, /x <~ N, satisfy 
"~ > ~ > y~ > y~. (2.6) 
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Following the usual conventions, for example, Luce, Raiffa (1957), let us denote 
a value of the two person zero sum game with the payoff matrix A by val[A]. That 
is, for a 2 ×2 matrix A = (%) with each {~(n)}-measurable el ment, 
val[A] = esssup essinf{p,q,au +p,(1 - q,)a~2+ (1 -p,)q,a21 
P .  q .  
+(1 -p , ) (1  -q,)a22} 
= essinf esssup{ p,q,al ~ + p, ( 1 - q,) a ~2 + (1 - p,) q,,a21 
qn Pn 
+(1 -p , ) (1  -q,,)az2}. 
Recursively define the sequence 3,, u, N TN-~ . . . .  , y N by setting 
I TS= W(N) ,  (2.7) 5(.) ] va'Ly(,) n=N-1,  N-2, . . . ,1 .  
Theorem 2.1. Tu. = ~N = TU, n = 1,2, . . .  N holds. 
Proof. Firstly we show as in the proof of Proposition VI-6-9 in Neveu (1975) that 
the operations ess inf~ esssup~ and the integral with respect to E ~"-1 are 
exchangeable. If  p ~ ~ and q 6 ~ ~, the random variable R (p, q) is integrable as it 
is dominated in the absolute value by maxl<~<N {X( i )+ Y( i )+ W(i)}. Clearly, for 
every n and q, the family E~"[R(p, q)], p c ~ is an increasing directed set. That 
is, for pl and p2, there exist p such that EJ"[R(p,  q)]=max{E~"[R(pl ,  q)], 
E~"[R(p 2, q)]}. Hence esssup~E~"[R(p ,  q)] is also integrable. Because 
R(p,q)<~{X(A(p) )+ max W(i)} fo ra l lp~ N,qc~ N n , 
we have 
E ~,, ,[esssup E~.[R(p,  q)]] = esssup E ~,, ,[R(p, q)] (2.8) 
by Proposition VI-I-1 of Neveu (1975). For every n the family of 
esssup~,~ E~;,,[R(p, q)] as q varies over ~ is a decreasing directed set and so its 
essential supremum - N y,  is again integrable. Therefore we have obtained the formula: 
E~-- ' [~ N] = essinf E~.-'[esssup E~.[R(p, q)]]. (2.9) 
We now show that the sequence ~,  n = 1, 2 , . . . ,  N satisfies (2.7) by the method 
of backward induction: For n = N this is trivial by (2.3). Assume the equality of 
(2.7) holds for n + 1. Note that, by (2.3) and (2.5), 
P'~"(A.<~p.,B.<~q.)=p.q., E~"[R(p ,q ) :A .<~p. ,B .<~q. ]=W(n)  
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and similarly for other cases. Since 
essinf esssup E~'[R(p, q)] = essinf esssup essinf esssup E~"[R(p, q)] 
N 6 N-  o ,  "-,/ N qE'~n PEO'~n qn Pn qE°-2n+l PG~n+l 
holds, it follows that 
-N  y. =essinf esssup{p.q.W(n)+p.(1 -q . )X (n)+(1  -p . )q .Y (n )  
q,, P~ 
+ (1 -p . ) (1  - q.) essinf E~"[esssup E~"+'[R(p, q)]]}. 
N o N 
-C~n+ 1 °.~' n + I 
Therefore, using (2.8) and (2.9), ~ satisfies (2.7). Similarly it is proved that y~ 
satisfies the same equality. Hence the result is proved. 
Corollary 2.2. (i) min{W(n), X(n)}~< y,N~<max{W(n), Y(n)} and 
(ii) min{ Y(n), E~n[yY+,]}~ < y~< max{X(n), E~"[y~+~]} for each n. 
Corollary 2.3. If 
X(n)<- W(n)<- Y(n) 
for each n with probability 1, then 
[Y (n )  if Y(n)<-E~°[Ty+~], 
TY = ~E~,,[yY+l] if X(n)<-E~°[TnN+I]<~ Y(n), 
IX (n )  if E~,[yy+~]<~X(n). 
That is, 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
T~-E~. [T~+I ]=(X(n) -E~. [TL , ] )+- (Y (n) -E~°[y~+, ]  )- (2.12) 
where (a) + = max(a, 0) and (a)- = ( -a)  +. Therefore a pair of the pure strategy p* 
and q* such thatp* = 1 if y N = X(n),  q* = 1 if y~ = Y(n) andp* = q* = 0 otherwise 
for each n, gives an equilibrium one. 
The condition (2.10) reduces the equilibrium strategy to a pure one. The equalities 
(2.11) in the corollary provide a finite horizon case of Neveu's result. It is seen the 
ransom sequence W(n), n = 1, 2, . . .  is irrelevant for the recursive quation (2.12) 
because the declaration of both stopping never occurs. Similarly to (2.12), Dynkin's 
recursive quation is written as 
y~-E~"[  yN+~]= I~.>o~(X(n)-E~.[ ynN+l])+- I~°<o~(X(n)-E~,,[ y~+l]) - (2.13) 
where the sequence {~bn} denotes the moves of the game. That is, Player 1 (resp. 
Player 2) can select stop when ~b. > 0 (~b. < 0). 
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3. Infinite horizon problem with a discount factor 
For a strategy p ~ ~,  = ~,~ and q c ~, = ~,~, the terminal time r(p, q) in the game 
equals min()t (p) , /z(q)) .  However, if the terminal time is not finite, then the payoff 
cannot be made. Here we set the payoff to be 0 when the game is not terminated. 
Also we incorporate a discount factor, a constant /3 with 0 </3 < 1, to assure the 
convergence of the payoff. Let 
~. = essinf esssup E~"[/3~'(P'q)-"R(p, q)]
-c2,, ?P ,, 
y, = esssup essinfE~,,[/3~(P'q)-'R(p, q)]. (3.1) 
Consider a recursive equation: 
x( , )  ] 
~°=va~Lg(n ) /3E~.[~,+dj n=1,2,. . .  (3.2) 
The next theorem corresponds to Proposition VI-6-9 of  Neveu (1975) but we need 
not assume that X(n)<~ W(n)=- Y(n). 
Theorem 3.1. Assume that 
E[sup [W(n)l] <co, E[sup Y(n) - ]  <oo and E[sup X(n)  +] <oo. (3.3) 
n n n 
Then ~, and 3', coincide for all n and the sequence satisfies the above reeursive quation. 
Proof. First we note that the assumption (3.3) implies 
esssup E~.[fl~(P'q)-~R(p, q)] =/3E~.[esssup E~.+,[fl~(P'q)-~-lR(p, q)]] 
"c~n + 1 ~n+l  
because a similar discussion as for (2.8) holds. Since E~"÷l[/3~(P'q)-n-lR(p, q)] is 
independent of q., we obtain that 
~,. = essinf esssup{p.q.W(n)+ p.(1 - q . )X(n)+ (1 -p . )q .Y (n )  
q,~ P .  
+/3(1 - p . ) ( l  - q . )E  ~- [ ~.+,]), 
similarly to (2.9). Hence the sequence ~. satisfies the equation (3.2). Symmetrically 
it is proved that Y. also satisfies (3.2). 
Let Y. be a solution of  (3.2) and let p* = (p*), q* -= (q*) be an associated strategy. 
That is, 
"y. = p'q* W(n) +p*(1 - q*)X(n) + (1 -p*)q* Y(n) 
+/3(1 - p*)(1 - q*)E~'[y,+,] (3.4) 
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for each n and r* = r(p*,  q*). By (3.1) and (3.2), it follows that 
E~. [ f l ' * - "R(p  *, q*)] - y, 
= . (1 -p* ) (1  -q  /3,--,+~E ~
LLk=n 
x (E~m+l[/3~-*-'-lR(p *, q*)] - Ym+~)] 
for any m/> n. Since/3 < 1, by letting m -~oo, it follows that 
E~;o[/3"~*-"R(p *, q*)] = y.. (3.5) 
Consider a strategy q<~)= (q]m), q~,,,) . . . .  ) defined by, for each k, 
q~)=q* ,  k>m,  q~m)=qk , k<~m 
with the pre-specified q* = (q*, q* . . . .  ) and arbitrary strategy q = (q~, qz,- • .)- Since 
E~o[/3,(p*,q,,°,)-,,R(p. ' q(m))] = E~.[ /3 ,* -mR(p. ,  q(m))] = E~ [Tm+,] 
is obtained by (3.5), it is immediately seen from (3.4) and the definition 
of  (3.2) that Ym ~ EJ;m[/3 T(p*'q{")) mR(P *, q{m))]. Iteratively, y, ~< 
E~°[fl "(p*'q~) "R(p* ,q(" ) ) ]  holds for each m>~n. Letting m-~oo, we have 
y, <~ E~,,[fl ~(p*'q) "R(p* ,  q)]. As the strategy q is arbitrary, 
y. ~ essinf E~o[flT(P*'q)-"R(p*, q)] 
~< esssup essinfE~,,[fl~{P'q)-"R(p, q)] = y,. 
~o ~ 
The other inequality y,/> y, is proved symmetrically. Hence these show that ~, = y, 
and simultaneously that the solution y, in (3,2) constitute the unique sequence. 
Corollary 3.2. I f  X ( n ) ~ W ( n ) <~ Y ( n ) for each n, than an e-equilibrium pure strategy 
exists for arbitrary s > O. 
Note that the random variable W(n)  is irrelevant, as is seen in (2.12), because 
the declaration of  both stopping never occurs in the case under consideration. To 
let e = 0, we must show the terminal time is finite with probability 1, so conditions 
such as l im,X(n)  = -oo, l im, Y(n)  = oo are needed (refer to Theorem 4.5 in Chow, 
Robbins, Siegmund). In this paper we give a condition in the next theorem, which 
is the due to the property of  the matrix game. 
Theorem 3.3. In addition to the condition of Theorem 3.1, assume that 
$1 ~ $2 c • • • , ~J S,, = g2 (3.6) 
n=l  
where S, = { Y (n  ) <~ W( n) <~ X(n)} for each n. Then the terminal time of the game is 
finite with probability 1 and an equilibrium strategy exists. 
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Proof .  Because  e i ther  p layer  dec lares  s top when the event  Sn occurs ,  the  resu l t  is 
immediate .  
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